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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tarango Deforest Padilla appeals from the district court's order denying
his petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts underlying Padilla's
criminal convictions as follows:
At approximately 2:30 a.m. one morning in August 2009,
Officer Matthew Gonzales, who was on routine patrol driving
through an alley, saw Padilla and attempted to make contact with
him. Padilla fled and was subsequently found nearby lying on the
ground under a tree. During a search of Padilla, officers found two
financial transaction cards (cards) that did not belong to Padilla and
several spark plug pieces.[FN] Officers found additional cards,
spark plug pieces, and a flashlight upon searching the area where
Padilla was pursued and ultimately detained. Police contacted the
owners of two of the cards, who both confirmed they left their cards
in their respective unlocked vehicles the night before and the cards
were missing. Both victims denied knowing Padilla or giving him
permission to use the cards.
Padilla was charged with two counts of grand theft, Idaho
Code §§ 18-2403( 1), 18-2407( 1)(b), and with being a persistent
violator, I.C. § 19-2514, in separate cases later consolidated for
trial. ...
The jury found Padilla guilty as charged.
FN. Officer Gonzales testified at trial that from his training,
he was aware that ceramic spark plug pieces are often used
by criminals to easily break car windows. He testified he did
not know of any legitimate reason a person would have such
items on his person.
State v. Padilla, Docket Nos. 38899-38900, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 777
at p.2 (Idaho App. Dec. 28, 2012).

1

Padilla filed a pro se petition for post-conviction

in

cases

alleged, among other claims, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to suppress. (R., pp.13-21, 191-199.) Padilla also filed a motion
appointment of counsel, which the district court granted. (R., pp.22-26, 200-204.)
The court thereafter notified Padilla of its intent to dismiss his petition.

(R.,

pp.27-28, 205-206.) With respect to Padilla's claim that counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a suppression motion, the court advised Padilla that he failed to
identify, in his petition, any basis for suppression. (R., pp.27, 205.) In response,
Padilla, with the assistance of counsel, filed an amended petition. (R., pp.46-49,
53-58, 232-237.) In his amended petition, Padilla alleged, in relevant part, that
counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress, which motion he
asserted should have been based on an allegedly illegal "Terry stop" and
statements "made to police without a Miranda warning." (R., pp.54, 233.) The
state filed an answer and a separate motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.5961, 70-90, 238-241, 252-273.) The state also filed a motion to take judicial notice
of several documents related to Padilla's underlying criminal cases, as did
Padilla. 1

(R.,

pp.67-69

(state's

motion),

94-141

(Padilla's

motion

and

attachments), 146-148 (state's amended motion).)
Although the state requested summary dismissal, the court did not rule on
that motion but instead conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Padilla
withdrew his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to

At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the court addressed the parties' request
for judicial notice and ultimately admitted the documents that were the subject of
the parties' motions as exhibits. (Tr., p.5, L.21 - p.8, L.4.)
1

2

suppress based on Miranda, but maintained his claim that suppression should
have been sought based on the alleged absence of reasonable articulable
suspicion to support his detention as required under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).

(Tr., p.15, L.24 - p.16, L.9.)

After the hearing, the court entered a

written decision denying relief and a separate Judgment dismissing Padilla's
petition. (R., pp.154-165, 288-299.) Padilla filed a timely notice of appeal. 2 (R.,
pp.167-169, 301-302.)

2

Although technically two separate cases, Padilla's single petition filed in relation
to both underlying criminal cases was litigated in the same proceeding and t~
cases have been consolidated on appeal. (R., pp.177-178, 314-315; Tr., p.5,
Ls.13-14 (court noting that the cases were "set for hearing at the same time on
the docket because they are companion cases".)
3

ISSUE
states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying post-conviction relief given that
Mr. Padilla's trial counsel was ineffective in not filing a motion to suppress
evidence obtained in violation of the state and federal constitutions? Idaho
Const. Art. I,§§ 13 and 17; U.S. Const. Amends. 4, 6, 14.
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.5.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Padilla failed to show error in the district court's denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing?

4

ARGUMENT
Padilla Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court's Denial Of His Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing
A.

Introduction
Padilla contends the district court erred in denying post-conviction relief

because, he argues, he "did establish both deficient performance and prejudice"
related to counsel's failure to file a suppression motion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.67.) Padilla is incorrect. Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence
presented at the hearing shows Padilla failed to meet his burden of showing he
was entitled to relief.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil

proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence."

McKay v. State, 148 Idaho

567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834,
838,172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)).
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of
law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 27 4,
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998).

A trial court's decision that a post-

conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight.
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990).
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credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony,
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within
of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108,
110 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

Padilla Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing Counsel V'Jas
Ineffective For Failing To File A Suppression Motion
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-

conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v.

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,137,774 P.2d 299,307 (1989). With respect to the
deficient performance prong, the United States Supreme Court has articulated
the defendant's burden under Strickland as follows:
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a
conviction must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. A court considering a claim
of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption that
counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. The challenger's burden is to show that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (citations and quotations
omitted).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787. "A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
and quotations omitted).

19..:. (citations

When a post-conviction petitioner claims his counsel
6

was ineffective for failing file a motion in his underlying criminal case, the court
"may consider the probability of success of the motion in question in determining
whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez
v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995); see also
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) ("Where defend counsel's
failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal
allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth
Amendment claim is meritorious .... ").

"Where the alleged deficiency is

counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would
not have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs
of the test." Sanchez, 127 Idaho at 713, 905 P.2d at 646. "If the motion lacked
merit and would have been denied, counsel ordinarily would not be deficient for
failing to pursue it, and, concomitantly, the petitioner could not have been
prejudiced by the want of his pursuit."

kt

In his Amended Petition Padilla alleged:
Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to
suppress.
This is based upon an illegal Terry stop . . .. The officer's
vehicle appeared as if it were going to run Defendant down and so
Defendant ran from the vehicle. This did not create a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity that would rise to the level of allowing
a stop and frisk. Additionally, the behavior of Defendant was
caused by the actions of the officers.

The attorney for Defendant did not file a motion to suppress.
If he had then Defendant would not have been stopped and frisked
and would not have been arrested and therefore would not have
had to face trial.
7

(R., pp.54, 233.)

In his Affidavit in Support of Complaint filed in Padilla's criminal case,
which was admitted as Exhibit 2 at the evidentiary hearing, Officer Gonzales
averred, in relevant part:
On 08/07/2009, at approximately 0232 hours, I was traveling
eastbound in the alley between 5th Avenue East and 6th Avenue
East in the 400 black. As I was driving I noticed a male walking
southbound on Ketchum Street. When the male noticed my
marked police vehicle he started running. I got out of my vehicle
and yelled for the male to stop running. The male continued
running and was jumping fences during this time I was yelling for
him to stop running. The male, identified as Tarango Deforest
Padilla, was later caught laying [sic] in some bushes at the
intersection of 5th Avenue East and Blue Lakes Boulevard, in the
City and County of Twin falls, state of Idaho. Padilla was detained
until it could be determined why he had run. In a search of the area
where the male was lying, I located two financial transaction cards
and $458.00 dollars. Also laying [sic] in the area were some small
ceramic pieces of a spark plug, which through my training and
experience as a police officer I identified as a tool used to easily
break vehicle windows. More ceramic pieces of the spark plug
were located in Padilla's jacket pocket. I know these items are
often used to burglarize vehicles. All of the items that were located
in the bushes were clean and appeared to have just been placed
there. A search of Padilla's person produced 15 peach colored pills
with Watson 3203 stamped on it. These pills were identified using
the Drug Bible as Hydrocodone Biturate, which is a schedule Ill
controlled substance. The pills were not in a prescription bottle and
Padilla did not have a prescription for the pills. Two other financial
transaction cards were also located on Padilla's person. A small
red flashlight was located in one of the yards that I chased Padilla
through.
(Exhibit 2, p.2.)
Officer Gonzales arrested Padilla and, after transporting him to the jail, he
was "informed that Padilla had a warrant out of Twin Falls County Jail." (Exhibit
2, p.2.)

Upon being told he would also be "booked on the warrant[,] Padilla

stated that was the reason that he ran in the first place." (Exhibit 2, p.2.)
8

Officer Gonazles testified in similar fashion at Padilla's preliminary
hearing, providing further details regarding Padilla's evasive actions, testifying
that Padilla entered the alley, "stopped, fumbled around for a minute, and then
started to come out of the alley and began to walk again," then "looked at" Officer
Gonazles' "clearly marked patrol vehicle" and "turned and started running."
(Exhibit 6, p.10, Ls.1-8.)

Officer Gonzales also added that he was unable to

identify Padilla after he located him because Padilla was "unwilling to provide
information on his name." (Exhibit 6, p.9, L.10 - p.13, L.3.) At the jail, however,
jail deputies "were able to identify [Padilla] and gave [Officer Gonzales] a name."
(Exhibit 6, p.13, Ls.4-13.)
Nothing in Officer Gonazles' affidavit or subsequent preliminary hearing
testimony establishes error in counsel's failure to seek suppression based on an
allegedly unlawful detention.

It is well-settled that a police officer may, in

compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
underway. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

The "reasonable suspicion" standard is an

objective test that is satisfied if law enforcement can articulate specific facts
which, along with the reasonable inferences from those facts, justify the
suspicion that the person detained is or has been involved in criminal activity.
State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 408, 973 P.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1999);
Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896-897, 821 P.2d at 951-952. Reasonable suspicion is
a less demanding standard than probable cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896,

9

821 P.2d at 951.

Although a series of facts may appear innocent when viewed

separately, they may warrant further investigation when

together. State v.

Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001 ).
Under the totality of the circumstances and based on Officer Gonzales'
training and experience and appropriate inferences, there was reasonable,
articulable suspicion that Padilla had been involved in criminal activity. In Illinois
v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), the Supreme Court aptly noted:
"Headlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion:

It is

not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such."
Thus, while an individual undoubtedly has "a right to ignore the police and go
about his business" when an officer approaches and doing so does not provide a
justification for a detention or seizure, "unprovoked flight is simply not a mere
refusal to cooperate.

Flight, by its very nature, is not 'going about one's

business'; in fact, it is just the opposite." Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at 125. "Allowing
officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is
quite consistent with the individual's right to go about his business or to stay put
and remain silent in the face of police questioning."

kt

After lurking in the alley at 2:30 in the morning, and upon noticing Officer
Gonzales' patrol car, Gonzales fled - unprovoked. Although Officer Gonzales
was going to attempt to make contact with Padilla after seeing him in the alley,
Officer Gonzales did not detain Gonzales for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
until after Gonzales' unprovoked "headlong flight" and subsequent discovery of

10

him hiding in the bushes. 3 See State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 593, 903 P.2d
752, 758 (Ct App. 1995) (an individual is not seized until he submits to law
enforcement's show of authority).

"[C]ommonsense judgments and inferences

about human behavior" gave Officer Gonazles reasonable suspicion to detain
Padilla and confirm or dispel any suspicion that he has been engaged in criminal
activity. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at 125 (citation omitted).
Padilla acknowledges that "commonsense judgments and inferences
about human behavior" are relevant to the determination of reasonable
suspicion, but claims nothing about his act of flight was suspicious because, he
believes, it "seems a perfectly logical response by any pedestrian walking alone
at night when a previously darkened car suddenly begins driving toward the
walker from an alleyway."

(Appellant's Brief, pp.7, 9.)

One of the flaws in

Padilla's argument is that Padilla turned and looked at Officer Gonzales exiting
his clearly marked patrol car, and then fled.

(Exhibit 15, p.73, Ls.14-23.)

Moreover, Padilla's supposedly "innocent" explanation for his behavior is not only
irrelevant to whether it could be considered to inform whether Officer Gonzales
had reasonable articulable suspicion, Brumfield, supra, it is inconsistent with
Padilla's own testimony that he hid in the bushes and wanted to make sure he
"didn't have nothing [sic] on [him] in case [he] got found" because he "had a
misdemeanor warrant for a misdemeanor DUI at that time also, so [he] was

3

In his brief, Padilla notes that he "entered the alley way where Officer Gonzales
was parked with the car lights off. Officer Gonzales turned on the lights and
began driving toward Mr. Padilla and Mr. Padilla ran." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) To
be clear, Officer Gonzales turned on his headlights, not his overhead lights.
(Exhibit 15, p.73, Ls.11-13.)
11

panicking" and he

idn't want to pick up more

because [he] thought

[he] might have had some weed on [him]," so he "tossed everything that [he]
thought he didn't want found on [him] into the bushes." (Tr., p.41, L.25 - p.42,
L.9.) Officer Gonzales undoubtedly perceived precisely what Padilla admitted panicky behavior by someone who was engaged in criminal conduct. Padilla's
entire behavior, from walking in and out of the alley at 2:30 in the morning, to
fleeing when he saw Officer Gonzales, to emptying his pockets and hiding in the
bushes was more than adequate to give Officer Gonzales reasonable articulable
suspicion to detain him. Padilla's claim to the contrary fails. Therefore, his claim
that counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to suppress also fails
because such a motion would have been denied. For this same reason, Padilla
cannot show prejudice.
Padilla complains that "the district court circumvented the Terry problem
by stating that the police would have had the right to arrest [him] on his warrant
and search him incident to arrest." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Padilla contends the
court's "analysis is flawed because the police officers did not learn of the warrant
until after the unconstitutional search had been completed - not until Mr. Padilla
was at the jail being booked."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

The Idaho Supreme

Court has applied the intervening circumstances test in determining whether
evidence found pursuant to a valid arrest on a warrant is sufficiently attenuated
from an unlawful seizure immediately preceding the arrest. State v. Page, 140
Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004). This Court need not engage in such
an analysis because, although the district court did not conduct a Terry analysis,

12

that does not preclude this Court from affirming based on the correct conclusion
that Officer Gonzales had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Padilla and to arrest and search him based on the evidence discovered at the time of the
seizure.

See Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123

Idaho 573, 580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 (1993) ("where an order of the district court is
correct but based upon an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm upon the
correct theory").
Because a suppression motion based on an alleged Terry violation would
not have been granted, Padilla failed to prove counsel was ineffective for failing
to file such a motion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
judgment dismissing Padilla's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 11 th day of June, 2014.

/JE9'SICA M. LORELLO
~puty Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of June, 201 I caused two
and correct copies of the foregoing BRI
OF RESPONDENT to be placed in
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT
303 West Bannock
PO Box 83701
Boise, Idaho 83701

I
Attorney General
JML/pm
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